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Andrew Richman  
Finding The Perfect Balance: Combating Cyber Attacks Without Intruding on Civil 
Liberties 
 
Part I: Introduction  
 
The time has passed where the only threat to the United States and its people are that of 
physical combat. A new war is being waged all around us today, the Cyber War. Over the last 
decade, an influx of cyber hacking attacks has hit US government agencies, businesses and 
individuals.1 These attacks are threatening the way both the government and businesses use the 
Internet and store their private information.2 Cyber attacks have resulted in many companies and 
individuals throughout the United States calling for new security protocols, and legislative 
intervention to help combat this issue.3 With lawmakers’ adamant to help secure both 
government and business’ digital security, doing so may come at a privacy cost for individuals 
who use the Internet everyday.4  
 After more than five years of attempting to provide government regulations to combat 
cyber security concerns, Congress has made its final push.5 While companion bills were 
introduced and passed in 2015 respectively in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
legislatures have been obstinate to secure a system in which a new government intermediary will 
help field threats from private entities, and facilitate warnings to other potential victims.6 This 
                                                 
1 Ian Bremmer, These 5 Facts Explain The Threat of Cyber Warfare, TIME MAGAZINE, June 19, 2015, available at 
http://time.com/3928086/these-5-facts-explain-the-threat-of-cyber-warfare/ 
2 Jennifer Steinhauer, House Passes Cybersecurity Bill After Companies Fall Victim to Data Breaches, NEW YORK 
TIMES, April 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/us/politics/computer-attacks-spur-congress-to-act-on-
cybersecurity-bill-years-in-making.html?_r=0. 
3 Patricia Zengerle, House Passes Cyber-Threat Information Bill, Reuters, April 22, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/22/us-usa-cybersecurity-congress-idUSKBN0ND2IN20150422. 
4 Andy Greenberg, House Passes Cybersecurity Bill Despite Privacy Protests, WIRED MAGAZINE, 
http://www.wired.com/2015/04/house-passes-cybersecurity-bill-despite-privacy-protests/ 
5 Chris Velazco, Budget Bill Heads to President Obama’s Desk With CISA Intact, ENGADGET, 
http://www.engadget.com/2015/12/18/house-senate-pass-budget-with-cisa/ 
6 Gregory T. Nojeim, Senior Counsel and Director of the Freedom, Security and Technology Project, Hearing 
Before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee on Protecting America From Cyber 
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information-sharing platform is believed to open up means of communication between private 
entities and the government, helping each combat such attacks, as well as provide government 
agencies with information necessary to help catch and persecute such attackers.7  
Legislators finally achieved this goal in December 2015.8 The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 
(CSA) was inserted “into a must-pass Omnibus [spending bill] at the 11th hour, without 
debate.”9 Fearing an impending government shutdown, President Obama was obliged to sign the 
two thousand plus page spending package that funds the government through September 2016.10 
This has secured the highly controversial Cybersecurity Act of 2015, a place in United States 
law.11 Little is known about what long-term effects this hidden bill could have, but on initial 
inspection, it seems as if it will do more harm than good for the people of the United States.12 
 It is inevitable for a bill like this to be scrutinized harshly, just a few years following the 
release of thousands of National Security Administration (NSA) documents. However, the 
opponents to this bill may have a serious reason to be speaking out against it.13 This bill seems to 
have been drafted broadly, tending to make the bill not only one for cyber security, but for cyber 
surveillance.14  
                                                 
Attacks (January 28, 2015), available at https://d1ovv0c9tw0h0c.cloudfront.net/files/2015/01/HSGAC-Cybersec-
tes-1-28-15-final-TEH.pdf 
7 Id. 
8 Tom Risen, Obama Signs Cybersecurity Law In Spending Package, U.S. NEWS, December 18, 2015, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015-12-18/obama-signs-cybersecurity-law-in-spending-package. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Velazco, supra note 5. 
12 Id. 
13 Robyn Greene, The Protecting Cyber Networks Act: Undermines Privacy, Enables Cyber-Surveillance, and 
Threatens Internet Security, OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, (April 20, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/the-
protecting-cyber-networks-act/ 
14 Opposition Letter to Representatives, Civil Society Organizations, (April 20, 2015), 
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2885-coalition-letter-from-55-civil-society-groups-security-experts-and-
academics-opposing-
pcna/Coaltion%20Letter%20Strongly%20Opposing%20PCNA.b24d1869025848cb96385603d8208dea.pdf  
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The overly broad language of the CSA may result in companies to significantly expand 
monitoring of their users information and permit sharing to the federal government of private 
user information that would otherwise be illegal under previous cyber bills.15 Additionally, the 
bill requires federal entities to automatically distribute this user information to other agencies, 
like the NSA, and authorizes law enforcement to use this to investigate any threats of crime that 
they may find.16  
While it is necessary to help combat cyber criminals that threaten the foundation of the 
modern technological era, it is of greater concern to protect the privacy interests granted to 
individuals in the United States. Part II of this Note will provide a history of cyber attacks and 
the road that was taken to get to the CSA. Part III will provide an analysis of how the passing of 
the CSA will result in the undermining of the Electronic Communications Protections Act 
(ECPA), and could potentially invoke constitutional issues within the Fourth Amendment. Part 
IV will argue for an amending of such legislation that will narrow the scope of the bill to 
encompass that which the bill intends to cover, only cyber security.  
Part II: The Road To The CSA 
The last decade has seen an unprecedented increase in the number of cyber attacks 
throughout the world.17 As technology advances, and cyber defense measures improve, cyber 
criminals and their offensive tactics change.18 What started as mild disruptions by pranksters 
installing worms and viruses on basic computers has evolved into malware codes that can spread 
                                                 
15 Jadzia Butler, Cybersecurity Information Sharing In the “Omnious” Budget Bill: A Setback for Privacy, CDT, 
(December 17, 2015) https://cdt.org/blog/cybersecurity-information-sharing-in-the-ominous-budget-bill-a-setback-
for-privacy/ 
16 Risen, supra note 8. 
17 NATO, Cyber Security Infographic, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/Cyber-Security-in-
Focus/EN/index.htm 
18 Gregory Webb, Evolution of Cyber Attacks Infographic, VENAFI, (August 21, 2013), 
https://www.venafi.com/blog/post/evolution-of-cyber-attacks-infographic/ 
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throughout entire networks of company computers.19 Hacking has become a profession, and with 
an increase of malicious targeting of businesses and government agencies, the stakes have been 
raised.20 Reasons for the attacks differ, from anarchist groups such as Anonymous, to college 
students just trying to get an extra buck, the results are the same, secrets are leaked and money is 
lost.21  
The history of cyber attacks dates back to the late 1980s, when the first computer worm 
was created.22 This virus, generated by Robert Morris, “was the first widespread instance of a 
denial-of-service (DoS) attack.”23 While the Internet was still developing into what it would 
become today, the “Morris Worm” laid the foundation for future hackers to follow.24 This worm 
would also gain the attention of Congress, as they passed the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA), which made certain cyber crimes a felony offense.25 But computer hacks at this 
point were nothing more than an annoyance, and a hobby for computer fanatics.26   
As the personal computer began to integrate into the average American family household, 
from 22.9 percent of households owning one in 1993 to 61.8 percent of households in 2003, 
hackers began to realize the potential damage they could cause and the rewards they could 
quickly reap.27 Most importantly, the Internet began to grow in popularity and the information 
                                                 
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21  See generally Andy Greenberg, Google’s Three Tips For Sabotaging the Cybercrime Economy, WIRED 
MAGAZINE, September 24, 2015, available at http://www.wired.com/2015/09/google-offers-3-lessons-crippling-
online-crime-economy/?mbid=social_fb 
22 Ted Julian, Defining Moments in the History of Cyber-Security and the Rise of Incident Response, INFOSECURITY-
MAGAZINE, December 4, 2014, http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/the-history-of-cybersecurity/ 
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Florida Tech University Alliance, A Brief History of Cyber Crime, 
http://www.floridatechonline.com/resources/cybersecurity-information-assurance/a-brief-history-of-cyber-crime/ 
26 Webb, supra note 18. 
27 Statista, Percentage of Households With a Computer At Home From 1984 to 2010, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/184685/percentage-of-households-with-computer-in-the-united-states-since-1984/;  
See generally Webb, supra note 18.  
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average people and homeowners began to share over the World Wide Web would soon create a 
new black market for hackers.28  
As quoted by internationally known hacker, Space Rogue, “[t]he web changed [things], 
putting stuff at everyone’s fingertips. Money became the driving force behind the hacks.”29 The 
world began to run on computers, from “the stock market, to hospitals, and credit card 
transactions” and before the risk was assessed, hackers would make these businesses and 
innocent individuals pay.30 The early 2000s would see a sharp increase in attacks, ranging from 
malicious spam malware to steal login credentials, to DoS attacks on Microsoft, affecting 
hundreds of thousands of computer users.31 Federal entities were so slow to target and catch 
these cyber criminals, that in 2003 Microsoft offered five million dollars for information that 
would help lead to arrests of hackers affecting their operating system.32  
The Internet age would be flipped upside down in 2007 when Albert Gonzalez, a young 
hacking mastermind, and his criminal enterprise, revealed to have stolen over 180 million credit 
card accounts from TJX, the company which owned Target, Home Depot and many more.33 
While working simultaneously for the Secret Service, he and his affiliates inflicted damage to the 
company that would total more than four hundred million dollars over a two-year period.34 This 
put governments and businesses on full watch, as the world now could see the true damage that 
cyber criminals could cause.35 
                                                 
28 Jose Pagliery, The Evolution of Hacking, CNN, June 4, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/11/tech/computer-
hacking-history/ 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Paul R. La Monica, Microsoft: Bounty Hunter, CNN MONEY, November 5, 2003, 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/11/05/technology/microsoftbounty/ 
33 James Verini, The Great Cyberheist, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, November 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/magazine/14Hacker-t.html?_r=0 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
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Things worsened over the next few years and into today.36 As new hacking groups and 
criminal organizations have formed and flourished, the rate and cost to major companies, has 
increased substantially.37 Just in 2014, attacks occurred against companies such as Sony Pictures, 
Home Depot, and JP Morgan.38 The JP Morgan breach “affected more than 76 million 
households and seven million small businesses,” thus deemed the biggest hack of consumer data 
in United States history.39 Estimates figure that the “annual cost to the global economy from 
cybercrime is more than $400 billion.”40   
The effects of a cyber attack go far beyond that of money and the bottom line.41 As 
countries become more dependent on technology, “the threat posed by any one cyber attack can 
have devastating effects around the world.”42 Money is not the only worry, as cyber attacks have 
been carried out by multiple nations such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, lives could be 
threatened.43 The potential exists that an attack could “cause physical destruction” and a “cyber 
Pearl Harbor” with a single keystroke.44 The United States government is just as prone, as in 
2014 alone there were over 67,000 cyber attacks on federal agencies.45 This is compared to only 
5,500 in 2006, an increase of over 1,100 percent in fewer than ten years.46 
                                                 
36 Pagliery, supra note 28. 
37 Webb, supra note 18. 
38 Nojeim, supra note 6. 
39 Press Release, Office of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Opens New Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center, (October 30, 2009), 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1256914923094.shtm 
40 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ness Losses: Estimating the Global Cos of Cybercrime, June 2014, 
available at http://csis.org/files/attachments/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.pdf 
41 Andrew Nolan, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43941, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: LEGAL 
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS, (2015), at 2.  
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
44 Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Def., Remarks on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives For National 
Security (October 11, 2012)  
45 Andrea Peterson, This Terrifying Chart Explains Why Cybersecurity is Such a Big Problem For The Government, 
THE WASHINGTON POST, (June 18, 2015), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/06/18/this-terrifying-chart-explains-why-cybersecurity-is-such-a-big-problem-for-the-government/ 
46 Id. 
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Today, to understand the sharing aspect of the CSA, it is important to discern how 
exactly companies and entities monitor, combat and subsequently share cyber threats. Most 
entities use cyber security providers, who deliver “signatures” to help combat malicious cyber 
activity.47 These signatures are “specific machine readable patterns of network traffic that affect 
the integrity, confidentiality or availability of computer networks, systems and information.”48 
They report back specific cyber threat indicators, which hackers store within IP addresses, 
domains, emails, and files in which the signature can read.49   
The occurrence and complexity of these attacks increase each year, as hackers become 
more adept to the changing signature scans and other attempts of both the government and 
private companies to gain the upper hand.50 Previously, over 75 percent of perceived threats were 
made using basic spam, which could be prevented quite easily.51 Today, that basic form of cyber 
warfare has fallen to 42 percent, while malware and phishing are perceived to be 59 percent and 
57 percent of current threats respectively, which result in much larger and undetected data 
breaches.52 The success of these criminals has risen as well, as the number of successful attacks 
has increased by 144 percent in the last five years and the time spent for both agencies and 
companies to combat such attacks has increased by 221 percent.53 These numbers are shocking, 
and it is apparent that some action must be taken to help combat this issue.  
                                                 
47 Michael Daniel, White House Cybersecurity Coordinator, 007 or DDoS: What is Real World Cyber? at the RSA 
Conference (February 28, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-02-
28_final_rsa_speech.pdf 
48 DOUGLAS LOVELACE, TERRORISM: COMMENTARY ON SECURITY DOCUMENTS: THE CYBER THREAT 23 (Oxford 
University Press, Volume 140, 2015) 
49 Id. 
50 Steinhauer, supra note 2.  
51 CYBER SECURITY AND TRANSFORMATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES: KEEPING SYSTEMS AND DATA SAFE 4 (The Lockheed 
Martin Cyber Security Alliance, 2012) available at 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/isgs/documents/LM-Cyber-Security-Transformational-
Technologies.pdf 
52 Id at 6.  
53Steinhauer, supra note 2.  
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B. Unsuccessful Attempts at Securing Cyber Networks  
Following attacks on the Pentagon, Department of Defense, NASA, and major US 
banking institutions, legislators proposed an information sharing system called the Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) in 2011.54 The bill was the origin of the current 
CSA, and proposed a way for the government and private companies to share data 
instantaneously without the need for court orders.55 The bill passed through the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 248 to 168, but did not make it much farther, as adversaries began 
speaking out against the bill.56 A year after its dissolution, in early 2013, the bill was proposed to 
the House of Representatives in an identical form.57  
This bill and the encompassing cyber security measures seemed to have a positive 
outlook for legislators, as President Obama even signed an executive order “setting forth a 
proposed program to support the cyber security efforts of privately owned [businesses].”58 After 
the release of thousands of sensitive government documents from whistleblower Edward 
Snowden, things quickly changed.59  With government snooping and privacy fears at the 
forefront of US minds, CISPA was slowly dismembered, as privacy opponents cited a few major 
flaws with the bill, which are similar to the ones that plague CSA today.60  
One of CISPA’s major defects was its definition of  “cyber threat information.”61 “Cyber 
threat information” was defined as “intelligence in the possession of an element of” anyone 
                                                 
54 NATO, The History of Cyber Attacks – a Timeline, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm 
55 Mark Peckham, 5 Reasons the CISPA Cybersecurity Bill Should Be Tossed, Time Magazine Opinion, April 19, 
2012, available at http://techland.time.com/2012/04/19/5-reasons-the-cispa-cybersecurity-bill-should-be-tossed/ 
56 Jay P. Kesan, Creating a Circle of Trust To Further Digital Privacy and Cybersecurity Goals, Mich. St. L. Rev. 
1475, 1480, (2014)    
57 Id. at 1480. 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Butler, supra note 15. 
61 Kesan, supra note 53 at 1501.  
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outside the government intelligence community.62 This definition was very vague, opening the 
door for countless interpretations of what included a “cyber threat.”63 CISPA was the first bill to 
try to break down legal barriers between government entities and the private sector, as it could 
expand the scope of what information they could receive.64  For example, “a company like 
Google, Facebook, Twitter, or AT&T could intercept your emails and text messages, send copies 
to one another and to the government, and modify those communications or prevent them from 
reaching their destination if it fits into their plan to stop ‘cyber security’ threats.”65  
This bill was so broad that the White House threatened to veto the bill if it reached 
President Obama’s desk.66 The White House believed that CISPA “still seek[ed] additional 
improvements and if the bill, as currently crafted, were presented to the President, his senior 
advisors would recommend that he veto the bill.”67 This seemed to be the final blow to CISPA, 
as the Administration stated that they “remain[ed] concerned that the bill does not require private 
entities to take reasonable steps to remove irrelevant personal information when sending cyber 
security data to the government or other private sector entities.”68 While the bill lost its steam, 
due to the aforementioned Snowden leaks, the Obama Administration did seem to have their 
sights set on an information-sharing platform in the near future, once the publicity surrounding 
government privacy concerns started to subside.69 
C. The Revival of Information Sharing and an Overview of the CSA  
                                                 
62 Id. at 1495. 
63 Peckham, supra note 52.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Executive Office Of The President, Statement of Administration Policy (April 26, 2013), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr624r_20130416.pdf 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Steven Dennis, Obama Pushes for Deals on Cybersecurity, Trade, Taxes, (January 13, 2015), available at 
http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-house/obama-meeting-with-top-congressional-leaders-without-harry-reid/? pos=adpb   
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While CISPA died in its tracks in 2013, this information-sharing platform has 
continuously been lauded as a necessary means to help protect private entities and government 
agencies against the threat of hackers.70 Some proponents argue that the “receipt of critical threat 
data can and has been shown to prevent potential cyber attacks and mitigate ongoing threats.”71 
The “one point of general agreement amongst cyber-analysts is the perceived need for enhanced 
and timely exchange of cyber-threat intelligence.”72  
Recently, the Senate and House legislators reevaluated the deficiencies of the original 
CISPA bill and revived it in early 2015.73 Similar bills were introduced and passed in both the 
Senate and the House within 2015.74 The House version, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act 
(PCNA), gained more steam than CISPA ever did, and even to many Democrats’ surprise, also 
gained support with the White House.75 In the Senate, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 
(CISA) entailed much of what was contained within the PCNA.76 While there existed many 
overlaps between the two bills, they became the basis for the now in effect CSA.77 However it 
seems many of the privacy protections, which were contained in the previous bills, have been 
pushed aside.78  
The CSA bill puts a recently developed agency, the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (the Center), to develop the process in which private entities 
                                                 
70 Steinhauer, supra note 2. 
71 Kimberly Peretti, Cyber Threat Intelligence: To Share or Not to Share—What Are the Real Concerns?, 13 PVLR 
1476 (2014) 
72 Nolan, supra note 41. 
73 Greenberg, supra note 4.  
74 Tom Risen, Cybersecurity Bill Passes In Senate, US News (October, 27, 2015), available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/27/opposition-mounts-as-cybersecurity-bill-goes-before-senate 
75Id. 
76 Abigail Tracy, The Problems Experts And Privacy Advocates Have With The Senate’s Cybersecurity Bill, Forbes, 
October 29, 2015, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/10/29/the-problems-experts-and-
privacy-advocates-have-with-the-senates-cybersecurity-bill/ (Outlining CISA and how it compares with PCNA)  
77 Id. 
78 Butler, supra note 15. 
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will share information with the government.79 This Center has been established under the 
umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which has already funded 1.2 billion 
dollars to the Center as of 2014, with 800 million dollars set aside for cyber security programs.80  
The CSA has four major flaws that worry privacy and civil liberty advocates.81 The first 
issue is that the CSA provides an overarching authorization for companies to monitor their 
networks for “cyber security purposes.”82 Second, the CSA authorizes companies to share a large 
amount of their user information with the government and with one another, granted that the 
shared information is a “cyber threat indicator,” which includes “information that is necessary to 
describe or identify . . . any . . . attribute of a cyber security threat.”83 Next, it would allow 
companies to disseminate this information with any government agency, and encourages it to 
directly share with the newly established Center, but would require that information to also be 
disseminated to other government agencies ranging from the FBI to the NSA.84 The CSA would 
then allow any government agency that receives this information, to use it for investigation or 
prosecution of any crimes that could result in “a specific threat of death, a specific threat of 
serious bodily harm, or a specific threat of serious economic harm.”85  
Part III: Analysis 
A. Laws That Will Be Implicated By The CSA 
The issues within the CSA may cross a multitude of legal lines.86 The CSA traverses into 
territories of electronic privacy laws, most significantly being the Electronic Communications 
                                                 
79 H.R. Con. Res. 2029, 114th Cong., Division N Title II (2015) (enacted) 
80 U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, S.2519, NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION 
CENTER ACT OF 2014 COST ESTIMATE (2014), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45594 
81 Butler, supra note 15; See generally Peretti, supra note 71. 
82 H.R. Con. Res. 2029, 114th Cong., Division N Title I Sec. 102(4) (enacted) 
83 H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Sec. 102(6) 
84 H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Sec. 105(d)(A) 
85 Id. 
86 Pereitti, supra note 71. 
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Privacy Act (ECPA). The CSA has also been alleged to overstep the government’s scope of a 
permissible search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.87  
The ECPA restricts the government’s use of wire tapping transmissions of electronic data 
by a computer, prohibits access to stored electronic communications, and tracing of such.88 The 
statute prohibits the disclosure or use of any contents of any electronic communication that was 
obtained through an illegal interception.89 This includes providers who are able to monitor their 
own networks, but are not permitted to release such information.90 
The Fourth Amendment protects American citizens from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by government officials, and compliance with such requires a court warrant.91 This 
protection only extends to individuals when there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”92 
While it will take a multitude of court interpretations to figure out how far the CSA can extend, it 
seems that it may violate the Fourth Amendment and have an impact over what information can 
and cannot be shared by the new law.   
B. The CSA Undermines the Current ECPA. 
The first major issue is that the CSA authorizes companies to monitor all of their users’ 
activities, opening the door for unauthorized interception of private information.93 Right now, the 
ECPA, the most in depth law that covers this area, prevents any person or entity to intercept any 
electronic communication.94 To intercept, means to use “any electronic . . . device, to acquire the 
contents or the substance . . . or meaning of the communication.”95 Furthermore, the ECPA 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 Electronic Communications and Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c)-(d) (1986) 
90 Id.  
91 U.S. Const. amend. IV 
92 Id.  
93 Butler, supra note 15. 
9418 UCS §2511 (2)(a)(i)  
95 Id. 
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prohibits the disclosure or use of the contents of any electronic communication that was obtained 
in violation of the statue.96 With a general reading of this provision, this privacy law would seem 
to be in conflict with the new CSA.  
The ECPA has two exceptions that the CSA intends to work around.97 The exceptions 
provide that information can be retrieved with authorization by “a party to the communication” 
and allows companies to supervise their own networks for self-defense.98  The first exception has 
already been trouble for courts, as it is difficult to determine in electronic communications, who 
is exactly a “party to the communication.”99 During a DoS attack, any user on a network who has 
opened a malicious file can be construed to fall under this definition of a “party to the 
communication.”100  
The second exception allows service providers to monitor their own systems with consent 
of the user, in “the normal course of employment, while engaged in any activity which is a 
necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of 
the provider of that service.”101 This enables these providers to conduct some monitoring to 
detect or defend against an attack after gaining consent of the individual, and may then disclose 
such communications recovered.102 While there is one court who has disagreed, most courts have 
determined that this exception can only be used with the purpose of protecting one’s own 
                                                 
96 18 U.S.C §2511(2)(ii)(B) 
97 Id.  
98 Id.; Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 297 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that for the consent exception to apply, the 
consent must be one who is a party to the communication) 
99 See generally Dep’t of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
Investigations, (2009), www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf 
100 Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2010) 
101 18 U.S.C §2511(2)(a)(i) 
102 Id. 
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“equipment and rights.”103 Barring these exceptions, narrowly interpreted as courts have held, 
the ECPA prevents any person or entity from intercepting and disclosing any other electronic 
communications, protecting American’s privacy in the electronic realm.104 
The CSA states that private entities can now “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
law . . . for a cyber security purpose monitor any information system of such private entity . . . 
[or] information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system monitored by 
the private entity.”105 This appears the CSA gives private companies blanket permission to 
monitor any traffic coming through its site, completely waiving the provisions of the Wiretap 
Act and the ECPA.106  The language “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” would 
suggest that the CSA now trumps the ECPA, expanding the scope of ISP monitoring in ways far 
beyond current law.107  This provision allows businesses and service providers to now monitor 
all of its users, without a consensual agreement and not only to protect themselves.108 More 
troublesome, is what these companies can do with the information that it collects. 
Next, the CSA will enable these companies to take the overbroad security monitoring it 
has been granted, and disseminate it to the Center, who will then distribute it to other 
government organizations and private entities.109 The CSA defines something that can be shared 
as “cyber threat indicators,” which means “information that is necessary to describe or identify . . 
. any other attribute of a cyber security risk.”110 Again, directly contrary to the exact language of 
                                                 
103 United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a company could intercept electronic 
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the ECPA, which does not authorize service providers to ever disclose or divulge to private 
entities or government personnel any contents of communications for the purpose of protecting a 
third party.111 Courts have consistently held, that even if the provider is acting out of inherent 
self-interest, in no way does the ECPA allow “unlimited” interceptions and then subsequent 
disclosures of those unauthorized seizures.112 This issue was something that even the DHS itself 
was wary about in the Senate version of the CSA back in August 2015, as Deputy Secretary of 
the DHS stated,  
[w]hile the [CISA] seeks to incentivize non-federal sharing through a DHS 
portal, the bills authorization to share with any federal agency 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” undermines that policy goal . . 
. . The authorization to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 
with “any other entity or the Federal Government,” “notwithstanding any 
other provision of law” could sweep away important privacy protections, 
particularly the provisions in the [ECPA] limiting the disclosure of the content 
of electronic communications to the government by certain providers.113 
 
The way the CSA is written, can be construed very broadly, to often times include 
information of a potentially innocent person.114 “Cyber threat indicators” in the new CSA, has 
been expanded from its origin bills, to now include provisions to share information that describe 
attributes of a cyber security threat and potential harms caused by an incident.115 This 
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information may allow sharing of unnecessary Personally Identifiable Information (PII).116 PII 
could include any sensitive information shared across the web, such as medical information, 
Social Security Numbers, or financial information.117 For example, an innocent victim’s 
computer may have been compromised by an unsuspecting hacker, and is now being accessed to 
engage in malicious activity, such as spear phishing emails, without the user’s knowledge.118 The 
service provider, or any company whose system this hacker reaches, can now share the IP 
address not of the hacker but of this victim.119 This will release not only the private identity of 
who the victim is, maybe even some PII of this innocent customer.120  
While in the CSA’s defense they do encourage and require for a non-federal entity to 
remove any personal identification that they find, these restrictions still seem to be overly 
broad.121 The CSA provides that a non-Federal entity must “review [a] cyber threat indicator to 
assess whether such cyber threat indicator contains any information not directly related to a 
Cybersecurity threat the non-Federal entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal 
information of a specific individual . . . and remove such information.”122 It can also implement a 
technical process to search for such individual information.123  
Yet, what is a non-Federal entity supposed to do when they do not “know at the time of 
sharing” whether a cyber threat indicator contains personal information not “directly related” to 
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 Margaret Rouse, Personally Identifiable Information, WHATIS, available at 
http://searchfinancialsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/personally-identifiable-information 
118 Id.; Federal Burearu of Investigation, Spear Phishers: Angling to Steal Your Financial Info, (April 1, 2009), 
available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/april/spearphishing_040109 (spear phising is “a virtual trap set 
by cyber thieves that uses official-looking e-mails to lure you to fake websites and trick you into revealing your 
personal information.”) 
119 Granick, supra note 109. 
120 Id. 
121 H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Section 104(d)(2)(A) 
122 Id. 
123 H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Section 104(d)(2)(B) 
 18 
such cyber threat indicator? According to the recent CSA guidelines that the DHS released, if a 
non-Federal entity does not know at the time of sharing, “the non-federal entity is not required to 
alter the shared information.”124 In the heat of the moment of a massive security breach, this 
leaves the door open for entities to now claim that they simply did not know of any personal 
information at the time of sharing, and ultimately circumvent the tedious, and possibly costly 
option of searching for personal information.  
This information is intended to be protected private information that the ECPA is sought 
to safeguard. However the CSA now guards all non-Federal sharers, shielding them behind a veil 
of liability protection.125 The CSA provides that “no cause of action shall . . . be maintained in 
any court against any private entity . . . for the monitoring of an information system . . . that is 
conducted in accordance with this title.”126 Combined with the fact that non-Federal entities 
seem to be able to share the “kitchen sink,” as long as they “did not know” it contained personal 
information, these same non-Federal entities now receive complete government protection for 
committing such acts.127 All of this seems to eradicate the ECPA, resulting in far less protection 
for individuals on their devices.128 The dissemination of this information, while illegal under the 
ECPA, may have far greater consequences for individuals.  
C. The CSA and the Fourth Amendment 
The passing of the CSA has opened the door by privacy advocates of its potential Fourth 
Amendment violations. These advocates suggest that because the CSA allows the federal 
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government to use information contained within shared cyber security threats, to investigate or 
prosecute individuals for crimes outside the scope of cyber crime, that individuals Fourth 
Amendment rights are at stake.129 While this new government tool for prosecution does raise 
concern, the CSA seems to be drafted perfectly to circumvent Fourth Amendment violations, as 
they are presently interpreted.  
The Fourth Amendment protects Americans against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”130 A “search” under the Fourth Amendment, specifically in the context of electronic 
communication, takes place when the governments monitoring violates “an expectation of 
privacy” that society considers reasonable.131 A seizure, in turn, occurs “when there is some 
meaningful interference with an individuals interests” in their property.132 It seems that the CSA 
could implicate the government on the search aspect of the Fourth Amendment, more so than the 
seizure.  
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that there was an expectation of privacy 
in electronic telephone conversations.133  However, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
held that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed on telephone records.134  Finding where 
the information shared in the CSA falls between these two expectations, will determine whether 
such conduct could be considered a Fourth Amendment violation. However, an individual will 
first have to show that a government actor conducted the invalid search.135  
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The Fourth Amendment only protects an individual against the actions of the 
government, not of individuals.136 For the private entities that share information under the CSA, 
they will have to be regarded as an agent of the government in order for any individual to claim 
that the search that has occurred, is in fact a Fourth Amendment violation.137 A search could be 
treated as a government search, “if the government coerces, dominates, or directs the actions of a 
private person.”138 Whether a private entity is considered an agent of the government, 
“necessarily turns on the degree of the government’s participation in the private party’s 
activities.”139 Many courts have employed a two-part totality of the circumstances test, which 
states that the government had to know of and acquiesce the intrusive conduct, and then whether 
the party performing the search intends to “assist law enforcement efforts or further his own 
ends.”140  
Using this test, one can analyze the conduct that will be taking place by private entities 
under the CSA. First, it seems that the government not only knows of, but also is encouraging 
businesses and private entities to engage in this monitoring and sharing of conduct. But, whether 
private entities are engaging in this type of activity to assist law enforcement, or to further their 
ends, is going to be an area of concern for courts in the time to come. On one side, these entities 
will be sharing information about attacks, which have already occurred, meaning that their 
interest in sharing this is limited, except to the extent of helping law officials find criminals. On 
the other side entities will be sharing this information in real time, with the hope that the Center 
has seen a similar cyber indicator, and can provide ways in which to stop it. While the former 
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seems to suggest that these private entities could be acting simply to assist law enforcement, the 
latter provides that they will be acting to further their own ends.  
Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, an even bigger challenge to anyone bringing such 
claim will rest in the fact that the government does not make sharing mandatory.141 The CSA 
makes it clear that nothing within its title creates a duty for any one, to share anything.142 This 
may weaken any individual’s argument that a private entity that is engaging in information 
sharing is in fact a government agent.143 It has been held that, if a government agent “is involved 
“merely as a witness,” the requisite government action is absent and the search will be deemed 
private.”144 However, the argument can still be made, as the 10th Circuit has held, that conduct is 
suspicious, and closer to a government actor, if a private search follows government 
encouragement.145 Here, although the government is enticing private companies to share, the 
companies will seemingly be engaging in this conduct to advance their own interests, to help 
combat cyber attacks against them, improving their service to their customers.146 For these 
reasons, the Fourth Amendment most likely will not be implicated.  
If an individual can show that a private entity is determined to be a government actor in 
terms of the CSA, the next question will be whether there is a search in which an expectation of 
privacy exists.147 The CSA makes it clear that any of the government agencies that receive cyber-
threat information, can then use the information to investigate or prosecute.148 The text of the bill 
clearly states,  
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Cyber threat indicators and defensive measures provided to the Federal 
Government under this title may be disclosed to . . . any Federal agency, 
department, component, officer, employee, or agent of the Federal 
Government solely for (i) a cyber security purpose . . . (iii) the purpose of 
responding to, or otherwise preventing or mitigating a specific threat of death, 
a specific threat of serious bodily harm, or a specific threat of serious 
economic harm . . . (v) [for] the purpose of preventing, investigating, 
disrupting, or prosecuting an offense arising out of a threat described in clause 
(iii).149 
 
While problematic, it may not extend to private information that has been held to have an 
expectation of privacy. It will ultimately come down to what type of personal information will 
make it past the non-Federal entities doors, and into the hands of the government. Courts have 
held that information conveyed to third parties, or information exposed to employees in their 
ordinary course of business, does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.150 Information 
such as email address names, email subject lines, websites visited, and amount of data 
transferred all fall outside the scope of a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.151  
However, if an individual’s email is compromised and malicious content is sent within an 
email exchange between said individual and another, it is possible that this exchange could be 
shared from the Internet provider, as a cyber security threat to the government. The government 
could then be in possession of these emails, and if this exchange contained anything in reference 
to bodily harm or death to someone, then the government could investigate or even prosecute 
using these emails.152 Under United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit determined that a 
“subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails “that are stored 
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with, or sent or received through, a commercial [Internet Service Provider (ISP)].”153 This court 
went further to state that the “government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the 
contents of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”154 
There are a number of possible PII or individuals information that may be sent to the Center in 
the coming years, that could present a case in which a reasonable expectation of privacy has been 
violated and a possible Fourth Amendment violation. Until then it will matter upon the 
precaution these private entities take in scrubbing and protecting their customers’ private 
information.  
 Finally, if an individual is successful in proving that the private entity should be 
considered a government agent, and that they committed an invalid search by violating a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the government may still be able to argue for a Fourth 
Amendment exception. The first, while brief, is a search conducted with consent. In this regard, 
if these entities include or enable a consent form on their website or service that their information 
is subject to such dissemination, maybe through a click-wrap agreement, then there would be no 
expectation of privacy for such user.155    
If no consent was acquired, then the government may still be able to argue a  “special 
needs” exception. If the government has a special need, it may eliminate the need for a warrant, 
only if the government can show that the search is reasonable at its inception and it is reasonable 
in scope.156 The courts will balance the intrusion on individuals with the benefit of such 
warrantless searches to society.157 While the government says it has a need to protect its citizens 
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form bodily harm or from death, it may not outweigh the intrusion on individuals, by being able 
to look through protected emails. While the information sharing could fall under the “special 
needs” doctrine, it would be specifically tailored to the details involving the initial cyber 
attack.158 But a person who is being investigated through a CSA sharing, for an erroneous 
suspicion of a cyber attack, could end up being charged with a completely unrelated crime during 
the investigation.159 All in all, the broad language of the CSA while difficult may open the door 
for Fourth Amendment challenges, as individuals’ personal information may be released to the 
government through the sharing of private entities.  
 
Part IV: Narrowing the Scope of the CSA 
It is evident that some level of information sharing may be necessary when it comes to 
preventing future cyber attacks and hacking. While it certainly will not end such conduct, it may 
be a step in the right direction, granted this step is taken with privacy interests in mind. As the 
CSA is currently construed however, this information sharing challenges the authority of the 
ECPA, and could be a potential Fourth Amendment concern.160 The purpose of the CSA can be 
achieved by a re-drafting to focus many aspects and provide for a narrower interpretation.  
First, the definition of “cyber threat indicator” should be changed, removing the final two 
subsections, F and G, which provide that a “cyber threat indicator” can be a description of actual 
or potential harm caused by an incident, and “any other attribute of a Cybersecurity threat.”161 
These two subsections are vague, and when drafting a bill that will enable such massive data 
collecting, these definitions open the door for private entities to share more rather than share less.  
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Next, the government hands the rights of the intermediary sharing system to that of a 
third party civilian agency, rather than a military agency.162 As of now the CSA enables sharing 
by a third party or the government, to any government entity, including the NSA. Putting the 
responsibility of the intermediary in a private entities hands will stimulate more private 
involvement and enable the civilian agency to double check and scan such information that has 
been transmitted before releasing it to the government. Civilian agencies have recently had more 
transparency, as intelligence agencies are far more opaque.163 The details about the scope and 
nature of civilian agency activities are more narrowly defined and interpreted, resulting in more 
understanding of what these agencies can and cannot do.164 
 This change will most likely encourage private entities that currently do not want to 
participate in sharing, for fear of government data collecting, to actually engage in this process. 
Many private entities have already publicly voiced their discontent with the CSA and the bills 
that preceded it, stating their desire to protect their users and their own information.165 These 
companies include Apple, Twitter, Yelp, Wikipedia and Reddit.166 After the Snowden leaks, 
mass collections by the government have resulted in little trust, that could be restored by having 
a third party intermediary.167 While important cyber security information can still be shared in 
real time with the government, it would be beneficial to all parties to have it conducted through a 
non-governmental entity.  
Additionally, even if a third party would be collecting this data, the bill needs to require 
that PII should be removed prior to sharing unless “it is necessary to identify or protect against a 
                                                 
162 Nojeim, supra note 6. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Juli Clover, Apple Speaks Out Against Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, MACRUMORS (October 20, 2015), 
available at http://www.macrumors.com/2015/10/20/apple-speaks-out-against-cisa/ 
166 Id. 
167 Finnegan, supra note 138. 
 26 
threat.”168  As mentioned earlier, the CSA mandates the removal of PII, as long as the entity 
knows it isn’t directly related to the threat, and if they are unsure, they are allowed to share it.169 
Changing this standard could greatly affect the bill, by limiting the scope of private entities 
ability to disseminate personal information. Further, the same standard should be adopted for the 
Center and the DHS. As of now, the Center has to destruct PII if it’s known that the information 
isn’t directly related to a threat. This new Center should only disseminate when it is necessary to 
block significant threats to national security.170  
Finally, and most importantly, the Government should only be able to prosecute and 
arrest, for cyber security purposes, cyber criminals within the statute. Allowing the government 
to use information received through this cyber security bill to investigate non-computer crimes, 
changes the purpose of such bill. While it is important to stop crimes of serious bodily harm and 
death, it seems it can be achieved in ways that do not include mass data collection and sharing. 
This change would also seem to limit most potential violations that could arise of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Part IV: Conclusion 
This Note puts forth the position that the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, currently 
undermines and violates the ECPA privacy laws, and raises potential Fourth Amendment 
violations. Cyber attacks are on a steady and violent rise, and have already resulted in a loss of 
billions of dollars for both the government and industries, making it is necessary to combat this 
problem, but it must be so without intruding into the civil liberties of the people of the United 
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States. This can be achieved through a narrower drafting of this legislation or new ideas, such as 
a third party intermediary.  
 
